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Abstract
What role does language play in the development of
numerical cognition? In the present paper I argue that
the evolution of symbolic thinking (as a basis for lan-
guage) laid the grounds for the emergence of a system-
atic concept of number. This concept is grounded in the
notion of an infinite sequence and encompasses number
assignments that can focus on cardinal aspects (‘three
pencils’), ordinal aspects (‘the third runner’), and even
nominal aspects (‘bus #3’). I show that these number
assignments are based on a specific association of rela-
tional structures, and that it is the human language fac-
ulty that provides a cognitive paradigm for such an as-
sociation, suggesting that language played a pivotal role
in the evolution of systematic numerical cognition.
Introduction
Over the last decades, results from several disciplines
relating to cognitive science (in particular from psy-
cholinguistics, developmental psychology, cognitive
ethology, and cognitive neuroscience) have shed new
light on the relationship between language and nu-
merical cognition.
On the one hand, the acquisition of some aspects of
mathematical knowledge seems to be linked to the
number words of a language. Psychological and neu-
rological studies suggest that the representation of
memorised mathematical knowledge such as multipli-
cation tables and its application in mental calculation
is closely linked to the language it was originally
learned in (cf. Dehaene, 1997).
In addition, cross-linguistic studies on the acquisi-
tion of number words have shown that the structure of
a number word sequence can have an impact on chil-
dren's mathematical performance:
1 a highly regular
and transparent number word sequence makes it easier
for children to grasp multiplicative and additive rela-
tionships between numbers and to correlate them with
Arabic numerals, than a sequence that contains opaque
elements.
For instance in the Chinese number word sequence,
as opposed to the one in English, the underlying deci-
                                                       
1 Cf., for instance, Miura et al. (1993) and Ho & Fuson
(1998) for Asian (Chinese, Korean and Japanese) versus US-
American (English-speaking) and European (British, French
and Swedish) first-graders and kindergarteners.
mal structure is always transparent in complex number
words (for instance, the Chinese counterparts for Eng-
lish ‘ten – eleven – twelve – thirteen – fourteen – ... –
twenty’ have the form ‘ten – ten-one – ten-two – ten-
three – ten-four – ... – two-ten’). In accordance with
this linguistic difference, Chinese children were shown
to have a better grasp of the base ten structure of their
number system and performed initially better in arith-
metic tasks than their American counterparts.
On the other hand, converging evidence from devel-
opmental psychology and cognitive ethology has re-
vealed numerical capacities that seem to be independ-
ent of language. Preverbal infants as well as higher
animals were shown to be able to grasp small nu-
merosities (the cardinality of small sets) and perform
simple arithmetic operations on them.
2 Evidence from
lesion and brain-imaging studies indicates that a spe-
cific brain region, the inferior parietal cortex, might be
associated with this ability.
3
This suggests that, while some later aspects of ma-
thematical cognition might be influenced by linguistic
factors, we also possess a biologically determined con-
cept of cardinality: a concept of numerical quantities
and their inter-relations that is independent of the ac-
quisition of a specific language, and independent of the
human language faculty in general.
Does this mean that our concept of number is inde-
pendent of language? In this paper, I will argue that it
is not. I will argue that language contributed to nu-
merical cognition in a fundamental way: in the history
of our species the emergence of language as a mental
faculty opened the way for systematic numerical cog-
nition. Symbolic thinking as the basis of language pro-
vided a cognitive pattern that enabled humans to make
the step from primitive quantitative reasoning to a gen-
eralised concept of number, a concept that is not re-
stricted to cardinality, but allows us to employ numbers
to identify cardinal as well as ordinal and even nomi-
nal relationships between empirical objects.
To develop this claim, I will first spell out the rela-
tionship between numbers and cardinality and show
that it is crucial for our understanding of the cognitive
                                                       
2 Cf. Wynn (1998) for a detailed discussion of the evidence
from infants and new-borns; Butterworth (1999) and De-
haene (1997) for overviews of numerosity concepts in human
infants and animals.
3 Cf. Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz & Cohen (1998).number domain not to focus on cardinality alone. I will
then introduce a unified notion of number assignments
that brings together cardinal, ordinal and nominal as-
pects. On this basis, I analyse structural parallels be-
tween number assignments and symbolic reference that
suggest that language provides a cognitive pattern for
systematic number assignments.
Numbers and Cardinality
One of the aspects that make numbers so interesting is
their enormous flexibility. A quality like colour, for
instance, can only be conceived for visual objects, so
that we have the notion of a red flower, but not the
notion of a red thought. In contrast to that, there seem
to be no restrictions on the objects numbers can apply
to. In his ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’,
John Locke put it this way: “[...] number applies itself
to men, angels, actions, thoughts; everything that ei-
ther doth exist, or can be imagined.” (Locke 1690,
Book II, Ch.XVI, §1).
This refers to contexts where numbers identify the
cardinality of a set: they tell us how many men or ac-
tions etc. there are in the set. This number assignment
works for any sets of objects, imagined or existent, no
matter what qualities they might have otherwise; the
only criterion is here that the objects must be distinct in
order to be quantified.
4
Frege (1884) regarded this flexibility as an indica-
tion for the intimate relationship between numbers and
thought: “The truths of arithmetic govern all that is
numerable. This is the widest domain of all; for to it
belongs not only the existent, not only the intuitable,
but everything thinkable. Should not the laws of num-
ber, then, be connected very intimately with the laws of
thought?” (Frege 1884, §14).
However, this is only one respect in which numbers
are flexible. Not only can we assign them to objects of
all kinds, we can also assign them to objects in ways
that are so diverse that on first sight, they seem not to
be related at all. Of these number assignments, the one
that relates to the cardinality of sets is probably the first
that comes to mind, but it is by no means the only way
we can assign numbers to objects.
The same number, say 3, can be used to give the car-
dinality of pencils on my desk (‘three pencils’); to indi-
cate, together with a measure unit, the amount of wine
needed for a dinner with friends (‘three litres of wine’);
it can tell us the rank of a runner in a Marathon race
(‘the third runner’); or identify the bus that goes to the
opera (‘bus #3’ / ‘the #3 bus’).
5
                                                       
4 This criterion on objects can be reflected in language by
the distinction of count nouns versus mass nouns, as their
designations (cf. also Wiese & Piñango, this volume).
5 As the examples in brackets illustrate, these different
usages of numbers establish different contexts for number
words that have to be mastered in first language acquisition.
Cf. Fuson & Hall (1983) for a study of the acquisition process.
We can subsume our different usages of numbers
under three kinds of number assignments: cardinal,
ordinal, and nominal assignments (cf. Wiese, 1997).
Cardinal number assignments are denoted by expres-
sions like ‘three pencils’ or ‘three litres of wine’,
where ‘three’ is an answer to ‘How many?’. In cardinal
assignments, the number identifies the cardinality of a
set, e.g. a set of pencils or a set of measure units that
identify a certain volume (in our example, litres).
In ordinal number assignments, the number applies
to an element of a sequence. For instance in the Mara-
thon example, 3 indicates the rank of a particular per-
son within the sequence of runners (the third runner).
We encounter nominal number assignments in the
form of house numbers, in subway and bus systems, in
the numbering of football players, or in telephone
numbers. What these cases have in common is the fact
that the numbers identify objects within a set: in nomi-
nal assignments, numbers are used as readily available
(and inexhaustable) proper names. So rather than
thinking of names like ‘Mike’ or ‘Lucy’ for buses, we
assign them numbers when we want to identify them
(for instance, ‘bus #3’), and similarly, we assign num-
bers to houses in a street or to the members of a foot-
ball team.
Hence, numbers are flexible tools that can be used in
a wide variety of contexts, where they identify different
properties of objects. Of these properties, cardinality is
only one instance – it is a property that we can identify
with numbers, but it is not necessarily more closely
connected to numbers than other properties that can
also be identified in number assignments (that is, the
rank of an object in a sequence, or the identity of an
object within a set). Figure 1 illustrates this view:
Figure 1: Numbers as flexible tools –
Integration of cardinality into the number domain
This approach, then, integrates cardinality into a
broader view of the number domain. It distinguishes
numbers and cardinality by characterising numbers as
elementary tools that are not necessarily linked up with
cardinality, but can equally bear on cardinal aspects,
ordinal aspects, or nominal aspects in application,














number assignmentsA Unified Approach to Number Assignments
What is it that makes numbers so flexible, how are
their different usages related to each other? To answer
this question, let us have a closer look at the different
ways numbers apply to objects, that is cardinal, ordinal
and nominal number assignments.
A theory that gives us a handle on these different
types of number assignments is the Representational
Theory of Measurement (henceforth, RTM).
6 This the-
ory, which has been highly influential within philoso-
phy and experimental psychology, is concerned with
the features that make a number assignment
7 signifi-
cant; it aims to establish the criteria that make sure
that the number we assign to an object does in fact tell
us something about the property we want to identify.
In the present section I will employ the machinery of
this theory to a somewhat different purpose, interpret-
ing the RTM as a unified framework for number as-
signments. This framework allows us to lay down the
constitutive features of meaningful number assign-
ments, the features that underly a systematic concept
of numbers and of the relations which they identify
between empirical objects.
In a preliminary approach, we can identify an as-
signment of numbers to objects as meaningful when
certain relations between the numbers represent rela-
tions between the objects. Figure 2 gives an example:
Figure 2:  A meaningful number assignment:
Numerical ranking of runners in a race
In this instance of number assignments, numbers
have been assigned to participants in a race, such that
the ‘<’ relation between the numbers represents the
                                                       
6 Cf. Krantz et al. (1971), Narens (1985), Roberts (1979).
7 The RTM uses the term ‘measurement’ (instead of ‘num-
ber assignments’) here. This terminology is slightly at odds
with our pre-theoretical usage, where ‘measurement’ refers
only to a particular class of cardinal number assignments
(those identifying empirical properties like weight, volume
or temperature), but excludes ordinal and nominal number
assignments, which are included under the RTM notion of
‘measurement’. In the present paper, I therefore use the
more intuitive term ‘(meaningful) number assignments’.
ordering of the runners by the relation ‘is faster than’:
Charles, as the fastest runner, received the smallest
number, 1; Mick, who is slowest, received the largest
number, 3, and Karen, who is faster than Mick and
slower than Charles, got a number that is smaller than
Mick’s and larger than Charles’s, namely 2. This way
the ordering of the runners as ‘Charles is faster than
Karen who is faster than Mick’ is reflected by the or-
dering of the numbers that they received: ‘1 < 2 < 3’.
The general features that make a number assignment
meaningful can be captured by two requirements. The
first requirement is that we regard the objects and the
numbers only insofar as they form relational struc-
tures, that is, sets of elements that stand in specific
relationships to each other. The two relational struc-
tures are distinguished as numerical relational struc-
ture (the relational structure constituted by the num-
bers) and empirical relational structure (the one estab-
lished by the objects).
Accordingly, in the runner example we regarded the
runners not as unrelated individuals, but treated them
as elements of a particular sequence. The empirical
relational structure is here constituted by the relation
‘is faster than’. The relation between the numbers that
we focused on was ‘<’ (‘lesser than’). All other rela-
tions that might hold between the objects (for example,
the relative age of the runners) or between the numbers
(for example, odd numbers versus even numbers), are
ignored for the purposes of number assignment.
The second requirement for the number assignment
is that the correlation between numbers and objects
constitutes a homomorphic mapping, one that not only
correlates the elements of the two relational structures,
but also preserves the relevant relations between them.
In our example, the homomorphism associates the
relation ‘runs faster than’ from the empirical relational
structure (the sequence of runners) with the ‘<’ relation
in our numerical relational structure (the numbers). So
for instance from the fact that one runner received the
number 2 and another one got the number 3, one can
deduce that the first runner was faster than the second
one, because 2 < 3.
The interesting aspect for our discussion is now that
this implies that number assignments are essentially
links between relations: it is not so much the correla-
tion between individual objects and individual numbers
that counts, but the association of relations that hold
between the empirical objects with relations that hold
between the numbers.
As a result, ew can now analyse the different kinds
of number assignments as instances of a unified pat-
tern: they are constituted by a homomorphic mapping
between two relational structures; a mapping that asso-
ciates, in each case, a particular numerical relation
with a relation between empirical objects:
8
                                                       
8 For a detailed discussion and formalisation of the different
kinds of number assignments cf. Wiese (2001).
MICK
CHARLES
KARENIn cardinal number assignments, the empirical ob-
jects are sets. A number n identifies the cardinality of a
set s (n tells us how many elements s has). The map-
ping associates the numerical relation ‘>’ with the em-
pirical relation ‘has more elements than’. The number
assignment is meaningful if and only if a one-to-one-
correlation between the numbers from 1 to n and the
elements of s is possible. For instance, when we assign
the number 3 to a set of pencils, this number assign-
ment can be regarded as a meaningful cardinal number
assignment when it is possible to link up each pencil
with a different number from 1 to 3. (We employ this
verification procedure in counting routines.)
In ordinal number assignments (like the one in Fig-
ure 2), the empirical objects are not sets, but individual
elements of a sequence. A number n identifies the rank
of an object within a sequence s. For this task, we focus
on the sequential order of numbers. The homomor-
phism that constitutes our number assignment associ-
ates the numerical relation ‘<’ (or ‘>’, respectively)
with the relative ranks of the objects within s (for in-
stance, the relative ranks of runners as established by
the relation ‘is faster than’ in Figure 2). The number
assignment is meaningful if and only if objects receive
higher and lower numbers with respect to their higher
and lower positions within s.
In nominal number assignments, the empirical ob-
jects are elements of a set (for example the bus lines in
a city), and the numbers are used as labels: a number n
identifies an object within a set s. The mapping associ-
ates the numerical relation ‘=’ (or ‘¹’) with the empiri-
cal relation ‘is (non-)identical with’. The numerical
statement is meaningful if and only if distinct objects
always receive distinct numbers.
What these different number assignments have in
common is the translation of relational structures. In
cardinal, ordinal, and nominal number assignments
alike, a relation between empirical objects is associated
with a relation that holds between the numbers. It is
this translation of relational structures that constitutes
number assignments, and by doing so, lays the ground
for systematic numerical cognition.
How did this principle evolve? In the following sec-
tion I argue that the translation of relational structures
as a cognitive pattern might have its origins in the
emergence of symbolic thinking. I will argue that it is
symbolic thinking, as a basis for the human language
faculty, that made this pattern available to the human
mind, and this way enabled us to develop a systematic
number concept.
The Contribution of Language to the
Emergence of a Systematic Number Concept
According to an account of language evolution as de-
veloped in Deacon (1997), the main step in the emer-
gence of human language (as opposed to animal com-
munication systems) is the development of a symbolic
system; in a process of co-evolution of language and
the brain, the adaptation of our brain to symbolic
thinking gave rise to the emergence of the linguistic
faculty we have today. To understand the significance
of this view for our investigation into numbers and
language, it is crucial to understand what Deacon
means by symbolic reference here.
Following a semiotic taxonomy as introduced by
Charles Peirce, Deacon distinguishes three kinds of
signs: icons, indices and symbols. In iconic reference
the sign shares some features with its referent, it is
similar to the object it refers to (such as the icon 
￿
 that
refers to a wheel-chair user). In indexical reference the
sign is related to the object by a physical or temporal
relation; it occurs together with its referent (for in-
stance, tears could be interpreted as an index for grief).
In symbolic reference, the link between sign and ob-
ject is established by convention, as in the case of hu-
man languages. The critical similarity, the similarity
between symbols and their referents, emerges on a
higher level, namely on that of the system. Symbols
are always part of a system, and they refer to objects
not as individual tokens, but with respect to their posi-
tion in that system. In the case of symbols, reference
shifts from individual signs and individual objects to
relations between signs and relations between objects;
it shifts from the token to the system.
Under this account, symbolic reference as the basis
of human languages is crucially a link between rela-
tions (sign-sign and object-object), not between indi-
viduals (signs and objects). It is the relations between
words that reference is based on.
These can be linear relations like the order of words
in a sentence, or hierarchical relations like ‘object of’
or ‘subject of’, which mark the relations between a
verb and its complements. For instance in the sentence
“The dog bites the rat.” one can identify the dog as the
attacker and the rat as the victim, because the noun
phrase ‘the dog’ comes before the verb, which is the
position for the subject in English, and ‘the rat’ comes
after the verb, in object position, and the noun phrases
in these positions denote the Agent (attacker) and the
Patient (victim) of the ‘biting’-action, respectively.
So the connection one makes is between (a) sym-
bolic relations like ‘The words the dog come before
the word bites’ (linear) or ‘The noun phrase the dog is
subject of the verb bite’ (hierarchical) and (b) relations
between referents, namely ‘The dog is the Agent in the
biting-event’; and similarly for the rat:
Figure 3: Symbolic reference as an association of relations
BITING
ACTIONAccording to Jackendoff (1999), in the course of
language evolution direct relationships between the
linear order of words and their referents are replaced
by links that are mediated by complex hierarchical
syntax. Here, this would mean that the focus of sym-
bolic relationships shifts from linear to hierarchical
relations: on an early stage in the evolution of lan-
guage, linear relations between symbols as evident in
speech (‘comes before / after’) would directly be asso-
ciated with hierarchical relations between referents
(‘Agent of / ‘Patient of’), whereas on a later stage we
would have (syntactic) hierarchical relations between
symbols, like ‘subject of / object of’, which can be
linked up with hierarchical relations between referents.
In both cases, it is the relationships that are associ-
ated, rather than individual symbols and individual
referents. Unlike in iconic and indexical reference, in
symbolic reference we pick out an object indirectly,
relying on links that connect relationships between
symbols (such as ‘comes before / comes after’, or ‘sub-
ject of` / object of’) with relationships between objects
(such as ‘Agent of / Patient of’). This is what symbolic
reference is ultimately about: it is a connection be-
tween signs and referents that focuses on relationships.
This means that symbolic reference is constituted by
a mapping between relational structures: we regard the
symbols and their referents only insofar as they are part
of a system whose elements stand in specific relations
to each other; the association of symbols and their ref-
erents is determined by the respective relations that
hold between them.
This is a phenomenon very similar to the one we en-
countered in the case of number assignments. As Fig-
ure 4 illustrates (for two of the runners from Figure 2
above), number assignments are based on links be-
tween relations, too: in number assignments we associ-
ate numerical relations with relations between empiri-
cal objects, just as in language we associate symbolic
relations with relations between objects.
Figure 4: Number assignment as an association
of relations
When we assign numbers to empirical objects, the
links we establish are not between individual numbers
and individual objects, but between a numerical rela-
tional structure and an empirical relational structure.
And when we assign symbols to their referents, the
links we establish are not between individual signs and
individual objects, but between a relational structure of
signs and a relational structure of the objects that they
refer to.
This means that we can identify the same pattern in
number assignments and in symbolic reference: in
number assignments a numerical relational structure is
correlated with an empirical relational structure; in
symbolic reference a ‘symbolic relational structure’ is
correlated with an empirical relational structure.
In both cases, the links between individual tokens (a
number and an object, or a symbol and its referent) are
based on their respective positions in the system, they
are constituted by links between relations (numerical
relations and empirical relations, or symbolic relations
and relations between referents). Figure 5 illustrates
these parallels:
Figure 5: Translation of relational structures
in number assignments and symbolic reference
This puts number assignments in a close association
with the symbolic reference that lies at the core of our
linguistic capacity, and shows us a way how systematic
numerical cognition could have evolved in the human
mind: in the development of our species the evolution
of symbolic thinking in the emergence of language
might have enabled us to grasp the logic of number
assignments.
Once we passed the symbolic threshold, a paradigm
was set for the systematic correlation of relational
structures, and could be applied in the number assign-
ments that underlie our numerical concepts. This way
symbolic thinking prepared the way for systematic nu-
merical cognition.
Under this approach, we can account for the capacity
to systematically assign numbers to objects by a rela-
tively small evolutionary step. According to this ac-
count, the use of numerical relational structures did not
develop from scratch, but could build on already exist-








relational structurebolic cognition – a re-usage that makes a lot of sense in
terms of evolutionary economy.
At the same time, language gave us a handle on in-
finity. The phrases we can potentially generate in a
language represent a discrete infinity: from a set of
primitive elements – the lexical items of our lan-
guage – we can generate an infinite number of complex
constructions by means of combinatorial rules. In the
words of Steven Pinker: “In a discrete combinatorial
system like language, there can be an unlimited num-
ber of completely distinct combinations with an ini-
finite range of properties.” (Pinker 1994, 84).
It is these combinatorial rules that constitute the in-
finiteness of number word sequences. The sequences of
words we employ for counting (‘one, two, three, …’)
are open-ended because of the generative rules gov-
erning the construction of complex elements. Through
number words, language provides us with the notion of
an infinite sequence.
9
Note that it is the possesion of the language faculty,
the emergence of language as a mental faculty in the
history of our species, that is crucial here, not the suc-
cessful and complete acquisition of a particular lan-
guage in individual development. This also means that
acquired or innate impairments of the language capac-
ity do not necessarily affect our ability to grasp num-
ber assignments, as long as the basic linguistic capac-
ity is still intact (including the association of relational
structures by homomorphic mappings).
And let me emphasise again that this does not mean
that without language, we would have no concept of
properties like cardinality or rank that we identify with
numbers. As the above-mentioned evidence from ani-
mal studies and studies with human infants shows, the
emergence of our number concept could draw on pre-
linguistic capacities we share with other species, for
instance our grasp of cardinality as a property of sets.
Language has been crucial in integrating these early
concepts into a systematic number concept, one that is
based on an infinite sequence of numerical tools that
can be used to identify empirical properties via a cor-
relation of relational structures.
Under this notion, numerical cognition as well as
language can be regarded as genuinely human; as
mental faculties that are not merely of greater com-
plexity (than, say, animal communication systems and
numerosity concepts) and grounded in a higher gen-
eral-purpose intelligence, but qualitatively different
and specific to the human mind.
                                                        
9 Cf. Hurford (1987) for a detailed analysis of number words;
Wiese (1997; 2001) for the status of number word sequences
within language and numerical cognition. In Wiese (2001,
ch.4) I show that linguistic generativity (and therefore infin-
ity) could be passed on to numerical cognition via counting
sequences, and that this transfer could take place not only in
individual cognitive development – as for instance assumed
by Bloom (1994) –, but also in hominid evolution.
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